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1 Introduction
In one of the first comprehensive studies of the
Grameen Bank (GB), Hossain (1988) found that
GB members belonged almost entirely to the target
group defined as households having no more than
50 decimals of land. Mis-targeting2 was estimated
around 4-6 per cent. Studies conducted in later
years, however, report the extent of mis-targeting
to lie between 20-30 per cent (Zaman 1996 and
Mustafa 1995 for BRAC; Morduch 1998; Sen 1996
and Kamal 1996 for a broader study). How does
one explain such large differences in these figures?
One explanation could be that, over time, borrow-
ers have bought land and graduated from the target
to non-target group. The other explanation could
be that over time mis-targeting has increased.
Both explanations are examined in this article using
household survey data on 354 Grameen Bank bor-
rowers in four villages of Madhupur Thana in
Tangail. The possibility of graduation seems
unlikely since there is a general negative relation-
ship between membership length and land owner-
ship. A close look at the data reveals that 1992
marks a watershed year. Seasonal loans were intro-
duced in 1992 which could be held alongside the
more common general loans. This expansion of the
loan portfolio increased the average loan size per
borrower, as well as the entry point loan size. At
the same time, it is found that both the incidence
and severity of mis-targeting are higher for post-
1992 entrants.
Traditionally, Grameen Bank's self-targeting mecha-
nisms (such as small loan sizes, focus on women
members, floor-seating during centre meetings,
saluting and chanting slogans, etc.) have discour-
aged the participation of the more well-endowed
(and possibly higher status) non-target group. lt is
hypothesised that rapid credit deepening through
the introduction of seasonal loans has led to
increased potential benefits for all the key stake-
holders (the non-target group, the Grameen Bank,
as well as the target group), encouraging non-target
I am grateful to Saurabh Sinha for providing extensive
comments on earlier versions of this article. The usual
disclaimers apply.
Mis-targeting implies including those who, according
to some pre-defined criterion, should not be included.
This is similar to the type II error in hypotheses testing.
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group households to participate, thereby increasing
the extent of mis-targeting.
The article is structured as follows. The second sec-
tion tests for mis-targeting based on the 'graduation'
argument. The third section provides evidence from
the survey data about the extent of credit deepening
since 1992. It also tests for the incidence and sever-
ity of mis-targeting among the post-1992 entrants.
The results are analysed in the fourth section.
2 Examining 'Graduation'
Argument of Mis-Targeting
The study uses a 1994-95 household survey of all
households in four villages of Madhupur Thana of
Tangail District. All these villages are served by the
Madhupur Branch of Grameen Bank which is one of
the first branches established by the bank in 1980.
There are a total of 2,566 households in the four
study villages. On dividing the entire sample into
target group and non-target groups based on the
household's current land ownership, it is found that
more than two-thirds of the households (76.8 per
cent) belong to the target group. Of these, more
than half (54 per cent) do not have any NGO par-
ticipation despite the high intensity of micro-credit
intervention in the study area.3
Programme leakage can be estimated by calculating
the proportion of non-target group households. Of
the 354 households that joined Grameen Bank,
slightly more than a quarter (25.4 per cent) of them
did not belong to the target group at the time of sur-
vey Such a measure however ignores the possibility
of 'graduation' of target group households into non-
target group. This becomes a real possibility if
households have been participating in a programme
for some length of time.
There were more than 30 NGOs serving the area and
most of them had credit components. All of the
nationally important micro-credit NGOs like BRAC,
Proshika, ASA etc. operate in the study area, Tangail.
Despite such a heavy NGO involvement, the fact that
more than half of the 'target' group population is 'non-
participant' is an indication that mere proliferation of
credit interventions, most of which offer pretty much
the same service, might not be all that relevant for a vast
majority of the poor (see Greeley 1996 for a similar
point).
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GB borrowers in the study villages had been mem-
bers for some time (the median membership length
is eight years), and their 1994-95 land ownership
might be different from that at the time of joining.
However, land ownership is assumed to be stable
due to a depressed land market,4 and serves as a
good indicator of initial endowment position of
participating households. The possibility that
household land ownership might differ between the
survey and start of membership is plausible, espe-
cially when membership length is high as is the case
for GB borrowers in the study villages.
Unfortunately, there is no information on land own-
ership of Grameen Bank households at the time of
joining. However, information on the last land mar-
ket transaction of households was collected during
the survey5 This information is used to categorise
participating households and identify those whose
entry point land ownership category is the same as
that during the survey period. The overall land
ownership change for all Grameen Bank house-
holds is shown in Table 1.
It is evident that:
Por 70 per cent GB households in the study area,
the survey period land ownership can be used as
their entry point land ownership. This is because
38 per cent of households had no land transac-
tion, and 32 per cent households reported their
last land transaction to have taken place before
joining the Grameen Bank.
Por households that reported their last land mar-
ket transaction to have taken place after joining
Grameen Bank, under a certain assumption,
there is no significant graduation from 'target
group' (i.e. landless and functionally landless) to
non-target group'. Only three households show
such an 'upward' trend, i.e. 99 per cent of those
households that belonged to target group at the
time of the survey were in the target group when
On low turnover of land, Basu (1990: 33) provides an
interesting explanation based on self-fulfilling theory He
argues that individuals hesitate to sell land because of
the expectation that land turnover is low and it is this
hesitation that in turn reinforces the low land turnover.
For each household, we have information on the
nature of the last land market transaction (whether
buying or selling land), year of transaction, size (in
decimals) of the transaction and the value (in taka).
Table 1: Cross-Tab Between Entry Point and Survey Period Land Ownership
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentage of row total.
Landless and functionally landless households (O-50 decimals) together constitute the target group. Other categories are: mar-
ginal (51-100 decimals), small (101-150 decimals), and medium (above 150 decimals). 100 decimals = 1 acre.
they joined. In general, except the entry point
functionally landless households, we observe
quite high levels of stability (the diagonal ele-
ments in Table 1). The incidence of downward
mobility from non-target group to target group is
also very low (only six households).
These two points suggest that land ownership sta-
tus of households is fairly stable and the possibility
of survey period 'non-target' group households
belonging to 'target group' at the time of joining is
limited for the Grameen Bank households studied.
Thus, there is little evidence of graduation (from
target group to non-target group) to explain the
temporal difference in the estimates of mis-
targeting.
3 Mis-Targeting Over Time: What
Does the Survey Data Really Tell
Us?
This section is in two parts. It first provides evi-
dence from the survey data about the extent of
credit deepening since 1992. Using econometric
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tests, the second part tests for the increased inci-
dence and severity of mis-targeting among the
recent (i.e. post-1992) entrants. A simple means
test is first used to confirm whether there are signif-
icant differences in landownership between pre-
and post-1992 entrants. Subsequently, a multivari-
ate regression is used to test whether the difference
in landownership is indeed because of the year of
joining.
3.1 Rapid credit deepening: the evidence
This section provides evidence of rapid credit deep-
ening using loan size information from the study
area. The introduction, in 1992, of the seasonal
loan, which borrowers could hold in addition to the
general loan, led to an unprecedented increase in
the average loan size per borrower. Table 2 shows
the trend in real loan size in the study area. It is evi-
dent that the increase in average loan per borrower
during 1992-94 is mainly due to the nearly twofold
increase in the size of seasonal loans. When the sea-
sonal loan was introduced in 1992, the average size
disbursed was low to begin with. However, by
1993, the average size of seasonal loan disbursed
Survey Period Land Group
(Row)
Entry Point
Land Group
(Column)
Landless Function-
ally Landless
Marginal Small Medium Total
Landless 129
(98)
2 131
Functionally
landless
44
(34)
83
(64)
3 130
Marginal 1 5 55
(89)
1 62
Small 1 14
(87)
1 16
Medium 2 13
(87)
15
Table 2: Trend in I.oan Size, 1992-94
Notes: Figures in parentheses are coefficients of variation.
All figures are in real terms with 1992 as the base year.
Deflaters have been calculated using Rural Price Index from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Report, 1997.
increased rapidly making the first year loan per bor-
rower in 1993 about 1.5 times the level in 1992.
Table 2 also shows the first year average loan size
per borrower.
This process of rapid credit deepening in the study
area seems to be part of an overall trend within
Grameen Bank, and is corroborated by other stud-
ies. Todd (1996: 178-80) reported that:
1993 was the year of a giant leap in loan dis-
bursement in Tangail Zone. The seasonal loan
which matched and sometimes exceeded the
general loan more than doubled total disburse-
ment in 1993. More than 50 crore taka was dis-
bursed in the new seasonal loans ... check the
monthly collection sheet at the branch office
most of the members are now canying a weekly
repayment of between 250 to 400 taka.
Rahman (1997: 12) found that one Grameen Bank
branch manager expressed his concern over
increased size of loans disbursed to the managing
director:
Recently there is an intense competition among
different managers to increase their loan dis-
bursement. Increasing disbursement is impor-
tant for the bank but we must not forget the
capabilities of our members. If we continue
with our present attitudes then the result will be
serious.
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12 Mis-Targeting among post-1992
entrants
The sample of Grameen borrowers is divided into
two groups, with group A consisting of households
which joined before 1992, and group B comprising
households that joined after 1992. Table 3 presents
the result of differences in means and proportions
test on some relevant variables. The results suggest
that there are siginificant differences between the
two groups in all variables. There is also a signifi-
cant decline in the proportion of group B house-
holds belonging to the target group.
Table 4 shows the results of an OLS regression
analysis which confirms that members joining in or
after 1992 have a higher current landownership
than those who joined in earlier years. That is,
inclusion error has worsened since 1992. The
model suggests that post-1992 Grameen house-
holds own, on average, 23 decimals more land than
earlier entrants.
It is possible that despite the increase in the inci-
dence of inclusion error, the actual severity is low.
This could be the case if most non-target group
entrants are only just outside the target group
threshold. Table 5 compares the land ownership of
the two groups to test for the difference in the sever-
ity of the inclusion error.
Variables 1992 1993 1994
Average loan per
borrower (Tk)
8628 (0.27)* 11215 (0.29) 11480 (0.24)
Average size of general loan
(1k)
5331 (0.33) 5578 (0.29) 5336 (0.25)
Average size of seasonal
loan (Tk)
3297 (0.28) 564t (0.40) 5881 (0.33)
First year average loan per
borrower (Tk)
6887 (0.15) 9736 (0.12) 10000 (0.13)
Table 3: Differences in Means and Proportions between 2 Groups of GB Households
Notes: Figures in parentheses are coefficients of variation.
* * * significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
Table 4: Results of an OLS Regression on Sample of Current GB Members
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Variable Group A (pre 1992)
households (n=269)
Group B (post-1992)
households (n=85)
t-test
Average land owned per 39.0 97.9
household (in
decimals)
(1.9) (1.2)
Average land operated per 113.9 173.7 2.29**
household (in
decimals)
(1.4) (1.1)
AME land owned per 8.6 19.9 437***
household (in decimals) (1.67) (1.2)
Proportion of target group 0.71 0.49 3.07***
(0.63) (1.02)
Variable Dependent Variable Current Land Owned in Decimals. N=354
Regression coefficient t-ratio Significance
Constant -120.71 -7.32 0.000
Adjusted family size 82.47 6.94 0.000
Household head's education
(years of schooling)
6.65 6.51 0.001
Household head's age on
joining
1.66 5.71 0.000
Membership dummy (1 if
joined in or after 1992, 0 if
otherwise)
23.44 2.6 0.010
Village dummy 1(1 if
Jatabari, O if otherwise)
52.43 4.73 0,000
Village dummy 2(1 if
Biprabari, O if otherwise)
26.61 1.73 0.085
Village dummy 3 (1 if Teki,
O if otherwise)
45.84 3.63 0.000
Adjusted R squared 0.32
Table 5: Land Ownership Distribution of GB Member Households (per cent)
The extent of mis-targeting in the pre-1992 group
of GB members is 21 per cent. It increased to more
than 50 per cent among the post-1992 members.
More importantly, nearly one-third of the post-1992
member households have more than 100 decimals
of land. Thus, there is an increase in both the
incidence and severity of mis-targeting among the
post-1992 GB members.
4 Conclusion
The previous section provided evidence of two
ostensibly independent processes since 1992: rapid
credit deepening, and an increase in the incidence
and severity of mis-targeting. Using a demand and
supply framework, it is argued that there is a causal
linkage between them. For, increasing incidence
and severity of mis-targeting is a consequence of
credit deepening. Introduction of a seasonal loan in
1992 is considered as an exogenous factor for the
purposes of the present research. Once an increase
in the average loan size is taken as a 'given', it is not
difficult to see how it might lead to increased incen-
tives for participation by the non-target (NTG)
This table was suggested by Saurabh Sinha.
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group (i.e. mis-targeting). As indicated in Table 6,6
all the three stakeholders stand to benefit from NTG
participation.
Further research based on a more representative
sample is surely needed that will examine the tem-
poral dimension of targeting with reference to the
changes in the contract and the organisational val-
ues (both implicit and explicit). As micro-credit
NGOs in Bangladesh are increasingly moving
towards providing differentiated financial services
(besides credit) and experimenting with various
types of innovative contract design (Rutherford
1995), a natural extension of this work would be to
examine how these affect participation incentives.
Conceptualising mis-targeting through direct mech-
anisms of selection by bank staff according to some
pre-set criterion might be missing out the impor-
tance of self and peer selection incentives (the indi-
rect selection mechanisms) that a joint liability
contract gives rise to. An understanding of these
incentives and the ways in which they are affected
by policy (implicit or explicit) changes could hold
important lessons for contract design and overall
policy
Landownership Class Group A (pre-1992) Households Group B (post-1992) Households
(n=269) (n=85)
Landless (1) 48.5 30.2
>0 to <50 decimals (2) 30.4 18.9
Target Group (1+2) 78.9 49.1
>50 to <100 decimals (3) 8.3 18.9
>100 decimals (4) 12.7 32.1
Non-target Group (3+4) 21.0 51.0
Table 6: Incentives for Non-target Group Participation
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